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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-PAYMENT OF CLAIM IN FULL-EFFECT-CARA-
VIA V. LEVY, iig N. Y. Supp. i6o.-Held, that the cashing by a creditor of
a check containing the words, "paid in full," signed by the debtor, is
not an accord and satisfaction unless there is a genuine dispute between
the parties as to the amount due.
In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary the payment by
the debtor of part of a liquidated or certain sum of money then due and
the receipt of that partial sum by the creditor with the agreement that
the original debt shall be thereby extinguished does not operate as an
accord and satisfaction. Abelson v. Gordon, 74 N. Y. Supp. 863; Mc-
Intosh v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 33. Contra, Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499.
Moreover, the giving of a receipt in full does not affect the general rule.
St. Louis (Etc.) R. Co. v. Davis, 35 Kan 464. But Connecticut holds
to the contrary. Aborn v. Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444. If, however, a re-
iease under seal is given in return for the payment of a lesser sum
than the debt, the whole debt is discharged in those jurisdictions dis-
tinguishing between sealed and -unsealed instruments. Hosler v. Hursh,
151 Pa. St. 415. Moreover, if the debtor gives to the creditor in addition
to the partial payment some new consideration there will be a valid
accord and satisfaction. Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash. 24. Such con-
sideration may be the payment of the lesser sum in some different place,
manner, or time, than that required by the original contract. Boyd v.
Moats, 75 Iowa 151; Jones v. Perkins, 29 Miss. 139. And the
payment of a lesser sum which is secured also constitutes a valid dis-
charge of a larger unsecured sum. Post v. Springfield Nat. Bank, 138
Ill. 559. If the debt is unliquidated or in dispute payment of a lesser
sum than is claimed constitutes an accord and satisfaction if that pay-
ment is accepted as payment in full. Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DEBT-IMPRISONMENT.-KIMBRELL V. BERRY, 67
S. E. 226 (S. C.).-Held, that a judgment in an action of tort is not a
"debt" within the meaning of the Constitution which provides that no per-
son shall be imprisoned for debt except in cases of fraud.
A judgment recovered on a tort is, for many purposes, such as, for in-
stance, the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions exempt-
ing homesteads from liability for debt, regarded as a debt. Delliger v.
Tweed, 66 N. C. 2o6; .Smith v. O mans, 17 Wis. 395. In. interpreting the
common constitutional clause which provides that there shall be no im-
prisonment for debts, however, the overwhelming weight of authority is
that a tort judgment is not a debt within the provision, and the body of
him against whom the judgment stands may be taken in satisfaction.
People v. Cotton, 14 Ill. 414; Lower v. Wallick, 25 Ind. 68; In re Mowry,
12 Wis. 52. In fact, the only state in which the contrary interpretation
is given is California. Ex parte Prader, 6 Cal. 239. The ground most
often assigned for the majority rule is, that the apparent intent of the
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framers of the Constitution was simply to relieve from hardship, those
innocent and honest contract debtors who, because of misfortune, were
not able to pay, and it was not their purpose to aid those tort feasors who
were guilty of evil doing. Moore v. Green, 73 N. C. 394. It has been
held, however, that, where the plaintiff has waived the tort in order to
sue in assumpsit, the judgment thus obtained is a debt within the consti-
tutional provision. Goodman v. Griffs, 88 N. Y. 629, 639.
ELECTIONS-PRESERVATION OF BALLOTS-INSPECTION.-BRYAN V. YUNG-
BLUT, 125 S. W. 251 (Ky.).-Held, that an inspection of ballots, though
demanded by the court for the use of a grand jury investigating offenses
against the election laws, is impliedly forbidden by Ky. St.. Sec. 1482
(Russell's St., Sec. 404), providing for the preservation of ballots, and
prohibiting their inspection except in election contests. Carroll, J., dis-
senting.
When the statute requires election officers to seal up the ballots so that
they cannot be seen or used, and prohibits the opening of them except in
the case of contested elections, they cannot be opened in any other case
and the courts have no power in the face of such a statute to compel
their production for use as evidence. Keenan v. People, 58 Ill. App. 241.
Hence, they cannot compel their production before a grand jury for their
examination even while investigating election frauds. Ex parte Brown,
97 Cal. 83. The object sought by this exclusion is the preservation of
the secrecy of the ballot and, although election frauds may be thus al-
lowed to remain undetected, yet the benefits arising from the secret bal-
lot are deemed to outweigh the mischiefs ensuing from fraudulent voting.
Ex pare Arnold, 128 Mo. 256. It has been held, however, that such
statutes are not binding upon a federal court when administering a
valid criminal law relating to election frauds and that such court can
compel the production of ballots before a grand jury, any law of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding. I, re Massey, 45 Fed. 629. If the
officer having the custody of the ballots refuses to produce them at an
election contest he may be compelled to do so. Gibson v. Trinity Church,
80 Cal. 359. And under some statutes ballots are not excluded as evidence
in a criminal proceeding for election offenses. Com. v. Ryan, 157 Mass.
403.
EMINENT DOMAIN-COMPENSATION-INJURY TO PROPERTY-ELEMENTS OF
DAMAGE-IMPROVEMENT OF STREET-REMOVAL OF SHADE TREES.-McEACHIN
V. MAYOR OF CITY OF TUSCALOOSA, 51 So. 153 (ALA.).-Held, a constitu-
tional requirement that a municipality taking property for public use make
just compensation for property so taken or injured, gave one whose prop-
erty is so injured, a right of action for resulting damages, irrespective of
whether the fee of the property is in the plaintiff or the taker, so that
if the removal of shade trees in the improvement of the street affects the
value or enjoyment of abutting property, the owner of such property
would have a right of action against the city for damages, though he
was not the owner of the trees. Dowdell, C. J., and Sayre, J., dissenting.
RECENT CASES 663
The weight of authority seems to be opposed to the doctrine laid down
in the principal case, most states holding that the ownership of the fee
in the streets is a good defence to an action brought against the munici-
pality by an abutting property owner for the destruction of trees in the
street in front of his premises. Gaylord v. King, 142 Mass. 495; Castle-
berry v. Atlanta, 74 Ga. 164; Tate v. Greenboro, 114 N. C. 392. And in
Baker v. Normal, Si Ill. io8, it was held that where the fee in the high-
way is in the municipality the abutting owner obtains no title to the trees
even though he planted and cares for them. On the other hand some.
jurisdictions hold that although a property owner has no claim or control
over trees growing in the highway as against the municipality,
yet as against third persons injuring or destroying them he may
recover.. Rockford G., L. & C. Co. v. Ernst, 68 Ill. App. 300; Lovejoy v.
Campbell, 16 S. D. 231. It is well settled that where the abutting owner
has the fee in the highway the timber and grass growing thereon are his
exclusive property, and he may maintain an action for damage to them.
Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165;
Bolling v. Mayor of Petersburg, 3 Rand. 563; Phifer v. CoX, 21 Ohio St.
248. But as a general rule it is held that a town may cut down trees
that obstruct travel, or are dangerous to health, without being liable.
Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 524; Bills v. Belknap, 36 Iowa 583; Well-
man v. Dudley, 78 Me. 29.
GUARANTY-CONTRACT-CONSIDERATION.-J. I. CASE THRESHING MACH.
CO. v. PATTERSON, ET AL., 125 S. W. 287 (Ky.).-Held, that where an
agent of a seller of machinery on being notified by the seller that the
intended buyer was insolvent agreed, in order to make the sale, to guar-
antee the purchase-money notes of the buyer on condition that the
buyer should not know of the guaranty, and the condition was per-
formed, the guaranty of the agent, though signed after delivery to the
buyer and the delivery of his notes to the seller, was supported by a
valid consideration. Nunn, C. J., dissenting.
It is essential to a valid contract of guaranty that there be a sufficient
legal consideration. Cowles v. Peck, 55 Conn. 251. Such consideration
may cohsist of any act in the nature of a benefit to the guarantor or to
any person at his request, Williams v. Marshall, 42 .Barb. (N. Y.) 524;
or may consist merely of a detriment to the guarantee. Ferst v. Black-
well, 39 Fla. 621. It is well established that if the contract of guaranty
is made at the same time as the principal contract the one consideration is
sufficient to support both the principal and collateral contracts. Jones v.
Kuhn, 34 Kan. 414; Parker v. Wetherell, 44 Ill. App. 95. Moreover,
the fact that the contract of guaranty was executed a short time subse-
quent to the carrying out of the principal contract, does not invalidate the
collateral transaction if it was executed pursuant to an understanding
had before the performance of the principal contract and was a material
inducement to the parting of value by the creditor. Standley v. Miles,
36 Miss. 434. But where the guarantor derives no benefit from the
principal contract and the contract of guaranty is made at so long a time
subsequent to the execution of the principal contract that it cannot be
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said to have been a part of it and the creditor has taken no action to his
prejudice in reliance upon the guaranty there must be a new and inde-
pendent consideration to support it. Peck v. Harris, 57 Mo. App. 467.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-INJURY TO WIFE-Loss OF CONsORTIUM-AcTION
By HUSBAND.-BOLZR V. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. Co., 91 N. E., 389 (Mass.).-
Held, that where a wife received injuries while a passenger on a street car,
resulting in her death, and the husband as administrator, recovered for
the injury and conscious suffering by her, he could not maintain a sepa-
rate action for his loss of consortium.
This decision is contrary to the weight of authority. It was held that
the husband might recover pecuniary compensation for the loss of con-
sortium, and the expenses to which he was put by reason of her in-
juries. Chicago & M. Electric Ry. Co. v. Krempel, 116 Ill. App. 253;
Washington & G. R. Co. v. Hickey, 12 App. D. C. 269. In some juris-
dictions the actions have been expressly separated, the right for con-
sortium and expenses to which he was put going to the husband and the
right of action for the injury going to the wife, or her estate. Ohio &
M. Ry. Co. v. Cosby, lO7 Ind. 32; Kelley v. N. Y. N. H. & H. Ry.
Co., 168 Mass. 308. It was held that the husband could sue for the loss
of the wife's society between her injury and death, even though it was
a very brief period. Nixon v. Ludlain, 5o Ill. App. 273. The case in
point directly overrules one of the same court where it was held that
the husband might sue for the loss of services, consortium and expenses
to which he might be put, while she might sue on a separate account.
Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 191 Mass. 563.
JUSTICES OF THE PEAcE-APPEAL BONDS-DISQUALIFICATION OF SURE-
TIEs.-HINES V. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER Co. OF AMERICA, 66 S. E. 989
(GA.) .- Held, that where the surety on a bond for a purchase-money
attachment in a justice's court is the sole surety on the appeal bond given
by the plaintiff in the attachment case, the appeal bond is a nullity, and
it cannot be amended at the hearing of the appeal by the addition or
substitution of other surety.
The execution and filing of an appeal bond, recognizance, or other se-
curity is generally a condition precedent to an appeal from the judgment
of a justice of the peace. Mann v. Lowry, 58 Miss. 73. The nature of the
security to be given on such appeal bond is controlled by statutes whose
requirements must be observed in order to confer jurisdiction uapon the
appellate court. Brown v. Brown, 12 S. D. 38o. A party to the appeal
is usually declared to be an incompetent surety on the appeal bond.
Baumbach v. Cook, 2 Tex. Civ. App., too. And likewise in some
jurisdictions attorneys are also disqualified from becoming sureties. Hud-
son v. Smith, iII Iowa 411. But upon the question, whether one who has
previously signed some bond made necessary in the action prior to the
appeal, is a competent surety on the appeal bond, the decisions are not
harmonious, some holding that such surety is not competent, Osborn v.
Hughes, 93 Ga. 445; and others holding that he is competent. Witten v.
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Caspary, 15 S. W. 47. When, however, the requirements of the statute
have been performed in substance, defects in an appeal bond as to
sureties which do not go to the jurisdiction of the appellate court, will
not prevent that court from allowing and requiring the appellant to
amend his defective appeal bond or to file a new one. State Say. & Loan
Assoc. v. Johnson, 70 Neb. 753; Murphy v. Steele, 51 Ind. Si.
MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY iEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT-NO-
TICE.-LOCKHART V. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO., 51 So. 627 (ALA.).
-Held, it is not contributory negligence on the part of a servant to fail to
give notice within a reasonable time of a known defective condition.
It is almost universally held that the failure of a servant to report
dangerous conditions to his master, is contributory negligence, and will
bar a recovery of damages for injuries received in consequence. Wood
on Master and Servant, Sec. 335; Washington & G. R. Co., v. McDade,
135 U. S. 554; Pautz v. Plankinton Packing Co., ii8 Wis. 47; Dobbins
v. Lang, i8I Mass. 397. This rule has been modified in some jurisdic-
tions, however, the servant being allowed a reasonable time for report-
ing the defect after it has come to his knowledge, and if that time has
not elapsed before the accident, he may recover even though he failed to
report the danger. Fordyce v. Edwards, 6o Ark. 438; Missouri K. & T. R.
Co. v. Williams, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 615. On the other hand, if the mas-
ter is aware of the danger, he cannot rely on the servant's failure to re-
port it as a defense. Mobile & Birmingham R. Co. v. Holborn, 84 Ala.
133; Pank v. St. Louis D. B. Co., i59 Mo. 467; Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
McCaffrey, 139 Ind., 430; Cushman v. Carbondale F. Co., i16 Iowa 618.
MORTGAGE-FoREcLosRE-REvERsAL OF JUDGMENT-SALE FOR TAXES-
RESTITUTION AND ACCOUNTING.-NATIONAL SURETY CO. V. WALKER, 125
N. W. 338 (IA.).-A suit to foreclose a mortgage was brought against the
mortgagors and V., who had acquired a tax title to the property. V.
answered, claiming title under his tax deed, and by cross-petition prayed
that his title be quieted against the plaintiff and his co-defendants, the
moltgagors. Held, that the property having been again sold for taxes
to plaintiff pending appeal from the judgment of foreclosure, and the
foreclosure judgment having been reversed, V., at least, was entitled to
restitution and an accounting. McClain and Evans, JJ., dissenting.
On the reversal of the foreclosure decree it is generally held that
restitution may be had. Whitsesell v. Peck, 176 Pa. St. i7o; Trow v.
Messer, 32 N. H. 361. But the right of a mortgagee, who buys the mort-
gaged land at a tax sale, to assert the title so acquired against lienors,
raises a question as to which of the courts are in conflict. Some hold
that the mortgagee cannot assert such title. Woodbury v. Swan, 59 N.
H. 22; Schenck v. Kelley, 88 Ind. 444. This view, however, is supported
on the ground of an obligation on the mortgagee to pay the taxes.
Blackwood v. Van Vleit, 30 Mich. 1i8; Moore v. Titinan, 44 Ill. 367. On
the other hand, other courts hold such a purchase valid because a mort-
gagee not in possession as such is under no duty to pay the tax. Neal v.
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Frazier, 63 Ia. 457; Waterson v. Devoe, 18 Kan. 223. That the title re-
lates back to the time of the purchase for the purpose' of substantial
justice. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bulte, 45 Mich. 113. That it is an
election to occupy the relation of purchaser with all the rights and in-
cidents which the law attaches. Williams v. Townsend, 31 N. Y. 41H. A
tax title, however, is paramount to existing estates, becoming absolute
after two years. Langley v. Chapin, 134 Mass. 82, and is prime to all
other inct-nbrances. In re Douglas, 41 La. Ann. 765, although it does
not affect prior incumbrances. Monow v. Dows, 28 N. J. E. 459. And,
although the title is one acquired at a second sale of the property for
taxes, the purchaser gets a good title. Diamond Coal Co. v. Fisher, 19
Pa. (7 Harris) 267, providing the proceedings are regular and the owner
has not redeemed. Atkins v. Hinman, 7 Ill. 437. Nor is he liable for
mo -y paid by the former purchaser under an older assessment, as to
whi,:, he was not in default. Smith v. Laumier, 84 Mo. 672. Only in
case the title he acquired is defective, is he liable to make compensation.
Stebbins v. Horton, 4 Kan. 353.
RAILROADS-INJURY TO ANIMALS ON OR NEAR TRACK-REUIREMENTS
AS TO FENCES.-MILLER V. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. Co., lO5 PAC. 908 (WYo.).-
Held, that a constitutional requirement making railroads liable for ani-
mals killed by them on an unfenced track outside of an incorporated
town or village, do not require the fencing of station grounds outside of
incorporated cities and villages, where public convenience requires the
same to remain open.
It is an almost universal rule that the statutes requiring railroad com-
panies to erect fences and cattle guards along the right of way, do not
apply to points where a compliance with the statute would seriously in-
terfere with the company in operating its road, or the public in doing
business with the company, as in the case of depot grounds. Mobile &
0. R. Co. v. House, 96 Tenn. 552; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Campbell,
47 Mich. 265; Robertson v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 64 Mo. 412; Moses v.
Southern P. R. Co., 18 Ore. 385; Contra: Buffalo, N. Y. & E. R. Co. v.
Bradley, 34 N. Y. 427. And as a general rule the depot grounds are held
to extend to the switch and sidetrack limits. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Hans, III Ill. 114; Davis v. Burlington, M. & R. Co., 26 Iowa 549;
Indiana B. & R. Co. v. Leak, 89 Ind. 596. But the question of the ex-
tent of the depot grounds is usually held to be a matter of fact for the
jury to decide. Railroad Co. v. Newbrander, 40 Ohio St. 15; Indiana B.
& W. R. Co. v. Hale, 93 Ind. 79; Snell v. Minneapolis, S. P. & S. M.
R. Co., 87 Minn. 253. Private shipping points, however, are not excepted,
even though occasionally used by the railroad company. Kansas City, F.
S. & G. R. Co. v. Hays, 29 Kan. 193.
SALES-BREACH OF WARRANTY-COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES.-SAPP V.
BRADFIELD, 125 S. W. 721 (KY.).-In an action on a note, given for the
price of a horse sold to the defendant by the plaintiff, to be used in
logging operations, and with a warranty of soundness, held, that the de-
fendant could counterclaim as damages only the amount expended on
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feed and medical attendance, after notice was given to plaintiff that the
horse was worthless, and an offer to return, but not the profits lost, and
expenses incurred in hiring other teams to complete his contract with
a third person.
The general rule is, that when an article is sold with a warranty of
fitness, express or implied, the purchaser without offering to return it or
to give notice to the vendor of its defects, may, if sued for the price,
recoup damages for such breach. Bonnell v. Jacobs, 36 Wis. 59; Mur-
ray v. Smith, 4 Daly 277; Dukes v. Nelson, Ex'or., 27 Ga. 457, or he
may bring an action directly on the warranty without complying with
these conditions. Borrikins v. Bevans, 3 Rawle, 23; Komejoy v. White,
io Ala. 255. Even if the vendor engages that the article shall be
returned, if it does not fulfill the warranty, still this does not preclude
the vendee from bringing an action for its breach. Douqlas Axe Manu-
facturing Co. v. Gardner, io Cush. 88. But, if by the agreement the
seller is given an opportunity to remedy the defects after he has notice of
them, the buyer cannot claim damages for breach of the warranty un-
less he gave notice, though he did not know what the defect was. Zimmer-
man Manuf. Co. v. Dolph, io4 Mich. 281. In any case the purchaser
may bring his action for damages for the breach, although the note
given by him is unpaid when he brings it. Trohreich v. Gammon, 28
Minn. 476. Even though a judgment has been obtained on the note.
Volland v. Baker, 32 Neb. 391. Usually the measure of damages for
breach of a warranty is the difference between the value of the goods,.as
they in fact were, and their value if they had been as warranted. Porter
v. Pool, 62 Ga. 238;Tiffany on Sales, p. 248. And whatever losses directly
result from the breach, e. g., loss of a crop, due to the inferior quality
of seed purchased and sown. Wolcott v. Mount, 38 N. J. L. 496. Contra:
Butler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 780; loss of profits due to a poorly constructed
refrigerator. Beeman v. Bantee, 1o N. Y. St. Rep. 325. But the true
rule in fespect to special damages is what a reasonable man, with the
knowledge of the parties, would have contemplated as the probable re-
sult of a breach of warranty had he applied his mind to it. Tiffany on
Sales, p. 249.
TRIAL-QUOTIENT VERDICT-WASHINGTON LUNA PARK Co. v. GOOD-
RICH, 66 S. E. 697 (VA.).-Held, that the finding of scraps of paper in
a jury room after it was vacated, with the names of the jurymen thereon,
and the amounts opposite their names added together and divided by
12, producing a quotient of between $2,300 and $2,400, did not show a
binding agreement to render a quotient verdict; the verdict returned be-
ing for $2,ooo.
A verdict arrived at by chance or lot will be set aside, and where, by
previous agreement a verdict is reached by taking the average of the
sums named, it is vitiated. Haight v. Hoyt, 5o Conn. 583. But an
averaged verdict obtained by taking one-twelfth the aggregate amount
of the several estimates of the jurors, is not objectionable when there
was no antecedent agreement to be bound by the result, and when each
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juror deliberately accepted the amount thus ascertained. Luft v. Lin-
gane, 17 R. I. 420; Sullens v. Chic. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 659.
If the amount finally announced as the verdict is less than the quotient
obtained after an effort to arrive at a reasonable figure by dividing by
twelve, the aggregate of the separate awards of the jurors, it will stand.
Johnson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Fed. 347. When the jury has
arrived at a quotient verdict by the addition and division, and after being
sent back for deliberation returns the same verdict, the judge having
instructed the jury as to the proper method of arriving at a verdict, it will
stand. Roy v. Goings, 112 Ill. 656.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES-PERCOLATING WATERS-DIvERSIoN-SALE.
-MLLER V. BAY CITIES WATER Co., 107 PAC. 115 (CAL.).-Held, that the
rights of owners of land overlying a water-bearing stratum to withdraw
and use the waters are correlative, so that one may not divert such wa-
ters for sale elsewhere to the injury of others.
The weight of authority is that the same rights exist in a subter-
ranean stream flowing in a definite and known channel as exist in a sur-
face stream. Tiffany on Real Property, Sect. 300; Whetstone v. Bowser,
29 Pa. St. 59; Burroughs v. Saterlee, 67 Iowa 396. And where these
rights are infringed, the owner will be protected. Keeney v. Carillo,
2 N. M. 480. In Taylor v. Welch, 6 Ore. 198, it is held that every pro-
prietor of land through which a stream of water flows has the right to
the use of the water without diminution or obstruction even though it
flow in an undefined and unknown channel. On the other hand, the
rule has been stated that the owner of soil through which an under-
ground stream flows has no property right to an undisturbed flow on
which he could maintain an action for its diversion. Brown v. Illius, 27
Conn. 84. As to water in the earth or percolating under the surface, the
general rule is that no correlative rights exist between proprietors of
adjoining lands in reference to the use of such water. Chatfield v. Wil-
son, 28 Vt. 49; Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363; Delhi v. Youmans, 45 N.
Y. 362, affirming 5o Barb. 316; Chase v. Silverton, 62 Me. 175. In one
case it was said that water percolating through the soil could not be dis-
tinguished from the soil itself, and that the owner of the soil was en-
titled to such water. Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King Mining Co.,
17 Utah, 444. But one owner will not be permitted to waste the water
to the injury of his neighbor. Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn.
58. And in a late case in New Jersey, a city was held liable in damages
for an injury caused by the sinking wells on its own land, through which
it drew out the percolating water. Meeker v. East Orange, 76 N. J. L.
435.
